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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
____________ 
 
No. 08-4282 
 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHANDRA SANASSIE, 
Appellant 
 
____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. 1-08-cr-00017-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to LAR 34.1(a) 
January 13, 2011 
 
Before: SCIRICA, BARRY, VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 31, 2011 ) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
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 This matter comes before us on the motion of Appellant Chandra Sanassie’s court-
appointed attorney to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967).  For the following reasons, we will grant the Anders motion and affirm the 
Judgment of the District Court.   
I. 
 Because we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our 
decision.  In or around March of 2007, Sanassie met co-conspirator Stephano Roussos.  
Subsequently, she agreed to participate in a scheme with Roussos and another co-
conspirator, Anthony Lofink, involving Delaware’s Bureau of Unclaimed Property (the 
“Bureau”).1  Lofink was employed by the Bureau to handle claims for property that had 
been escheated to the state.  He developed a plan whereby he created false claims for 
property escheated to Delaware in the wake of the merger of Time, Inc. with Warner 
Communications, Inc.2
Lofink created two false claims in the name of Sanassie related to property 
escheated by Time Warner.  Sanassie submitted her first claim on March 28, 2007, and 
deposited $195,282.12 into an account.  Next, she wired $65,000 to Roussos’ PNC Bank 
account, and $65,000 to Roussos’ Commerce Bank account.  She retained $65,282.12.  
Concerning the second claim submitted on June 4, 2007, Sanassie received a check in the 
  (PSR ¶¶ 18-24.)     
                                              
1 Under Delaware law, holders of unclaimed or abandoned property are required to 
transfer the property to the state through a process known as escheat.  (Presentence 
Report (“PSR”) ¶ 11.)  Owners of such unclaimed property, however, may present claims 
for escheated property.  (Id.)  The Bureau is responsible for such claims.  (Id. at ¶ 12.)   
2 The merged entity, Time Warner, Inc., escheated millions of dollars of 
unclaimed property to Delaware.  
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amount of $222,124 and deposited $122,000 into Roussos’ accounts.  Sanassie’s net 
proceeds were approximately $165,000, but the loss attributable to her for purposes of 
calculating an advisory sentencing guidelines range and restitution totaled $417,406.35.  
(Id. at ¶ 25.) 
On March 25, 2008, Sanassie pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and two counts of conducting illegal monetary transactions 
as proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 1957.  A sentencing hearing was held on October 14, 2008.  
With a net offense level of nineteen and a criminal history category of I, Sanassie’s 
advisory sentencing guidelines range was thirty to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment.  
(Id. at ¶ 86.)  The District Court sentenced her to a twenty-four-month term of 
imprisonment followed by two years’ supervised release for the conspiracy to commit 
wire fraud charge, and a twenty-four-month term of imprisonment followed by two 
years’ supervised release on the illegal monetary transaction counts.  The District Court 
directed that all sentences run concurrently, and ordered Sanassie to pay restitution in the 
amount of $417,406.35 and a $300 special assessment.  This appeal followed. 
 On July 15, 2010, Sanassie’s appellate counsel filed an Anders motion and brief, 
asserting that, after independently reviewing the record, he “found no viable issues to 
present to the Court on appeal.”  (Anders Br. at 11.)  Sanassie has not submitted a pro se 
brief. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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 In Anders, “the Supreme Court explained the general duties of a lawyer 
representing an indigent criminal defendant on appeal when the lawyer seeks leave to 
withdraw from continued representation on the grounds that there are no nonfrivolous 
issues to appeal.”  United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2000).  Our local 
rules provide that, “[w]here, upon review of the district court record, counsel is persuaded 
that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a motion to 
withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders[.]”  3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).  If we 
agree with counsel’s assessment, we “will grant [the] Anders motion, and dispose of the 
appeal without appointing new counsel.”  Id.  Thus, our inquiry is “twofold: (1) whether 
counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether an independent 
review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 
296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 In his Anders brief, Sanassie’s counsel identified three potential grounds for 
appeal: (1) the District Court’s jurisdiction; (2) the validity and voluntariness of 
Sanassie’s guilty plea; and (3) the legality of Sanassie’s sentence.  He submits that none 
of the potential grounds for appeal has any arguable merit.  Our review of the record 
confirms counsel’s belief that there are no nonfrivolous issues on appeal.     
 First, we agree that the District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, 
which provides that “[t]he district courts of the United States shall have original 
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the 
United States.”  It is indisputable that the statutory provisions that Sanassie admitted 
violating, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and committing an illegal 
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monetary transaction, 18 U.S.C. § 1957, are laws of the United States.   Accordingly, the 
District Court clearly had jurisdiction. 
 Second, there is no basis on which to challenge the validity and voluntariness of 
Sanassie’s guilty plea.  As Sanassie failed to make any objection at her plea colloquy, we 
review for plain error.  United States v. Hall, 515 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 2008).  Under 
the plain error standard: 
an appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial 
only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an error; (2) the error 
is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error 
affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means 
it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error 
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings. 
 
United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “‘[A] defendant who seeks reversal of [her] conviction after a guilty plea, on 
the ground that the district court committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for the error, [s]he would not have entered the plea.’”  
Hall, 515 F.3d at 194 (quoting United States v. Dominquez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 
(2004)).   
 The District Court’s colloquy covered Sanassie’s right to plead not guilty, her trial 
rights, the waiver of her rights by pleading guilty, the government’s factual allegations, 
the nature of the charges filed against her, the maximum possible penalty, and that 
sentencing recommendations of the United States Probation Office and the prosecutor 
were not binding on the District Court.  Although it substantially complied with Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the District Court erred in failing to address 
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the government’s right to prosecute Sanassie for perjury, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(A), or 
advise her of the court’s authority to impose restitution.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(K).  
Further, while the court informed Sanassie of her right to counsel pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(D), she was not specifically informed of her right to 
court-appointed counsel for trial or other future proceedings.  Nonetheless, Sanassie 
cannot demonstrate that the errors affected her substantial rights or seriously affected the 
fairness of the judicial proceedings.  
 Had Sanassie not pled guilty, she would have forfeited the three-point reduction 
for acceptance of responsibility, and greatly increased her potential prison exposure.  It 
would be patently unreasonable for Sanassie to reject a plea agreement with an advisory 
guidelines range of thirty to thirty-seven months, and expose herself to a much lengthier 
prison term, because she was not informed of the potential for a perjury charge if she lied 
to the District Court.  Moreover, there is nothing in the record which reflects that 
Sanassie perjured herself or that the government may bring perjury charges against her.  
 The other oversights in the plea colloquy were equally inconsequential.  Nothing 
in the record indicates that she would have abandoned her plea had she been informed of 
her right to court-appointed counsel if her retained counsel had been granted leave to 
withdraw from the case.  Moreover, Sanassie’s plea agreement, which she reviewed with 
counsel, stated that she “agree[d] to forfeit all interests in any fraud-related asset that the 
defendant currently owns . . . including, but not limited to $417,406.35.”  (A. at 49.)  In 
summary, the District Court conducted a thorough plea colloquy that complied with Rule 
11 in all substantial respects, and correctly accepted Sanassie’s plea as knowing, 
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voluntary, and intelligent.  See United States v. Tannis, 942 F.2d 196, 197 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(“No non-frivolous appellate issue can fairly be presented as to the adequacy of the Rule 
11 colloquy” where record established defendant understood the charge to which she pled 
guilty, the voluntariness of the plea, and factual basis of the plea).    
 Finally, we discern no arguable issue concerning Sanassie’s sentence.  A 
sentencing court is directed to follow a three-step sentencing process: (1) calculate a 
defendant’s advisory sentencing guidelines range; (2) formally rule on any departure 
motions; and (3) consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in imposing a sentence.  United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  We review the procedural 
and substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  Id.  
The District Court complied with the three-step sentencing process, and did not abuse its 
discretion.   
At sentencing, all counsel agreed that Sanassie had a total offense level of nineteen 
after accounting for a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  (A. 57.)  
With a criminal history category of I, Sanassie’s advisory sentencing guidelines range 
was thirty to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment.  Furthermore, the parties agreed that the 
range of supervised release was two to three years, and admitted that the court properly 
calculated the advisory guidelines range.  (Id. at 58.)  A departure motion was not filed.  
The District Court adequately considered the section 3553(a) factors.  The court 
recognized that Sanassie was a sophisticated businessperson, specifically acknowledged 
factors to consider when exercising its sentencing judgment, and observed that she filed 
multiple fraudulent claims for unclaimed property.  (Id. at 81-87.)  Ultimately, however, 
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the District Court imposed a sentence that was twenty percent below the minimum in the 
applicable sentencing guidelines range.  Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude 
that Sanassie’s sentence was unreasonable.  Accordingly, any appeal of Sanassie’s 
sentence lacks merit.    
III. 
 Appellate counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of Anders.  Our 
independent review of the record does not reveal any nonfrivolous grounds for appeal.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Judgment of the District Court, and 
appellate counsel’s Anders motion will be granted.3
                                              
3 Sanassie is hereby advised that under the Criminal Justice Act counsel is not 
obligated to file a petition for rehearing in this Court or a petition for writ of certiorari in 
the United States Supreme Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 35.4; 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(b).  If 
Sanassie wants to pursue these avenues, she must do so either through retained counsel or  
pro se. 
 
